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ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND POLITICAL
CORRECTNESS IN UNCIVIL TIMES
RODNEY A. SMOLLA*
I. IMAGINE...
Imagine that the editors of First Amendment Law Review
("FALR") at the University of North Carolina School of Law ("UNC
Law") decide to hold a symposium on the current state of academic
freedom on American university campuses. This is an imaginary, fic-
tional group of editors, not the actual current editors of FALR who
have organized this symposium.'
The editors of FALR already have preconceived views on the
state of academic freedom in America. They believe it is in a precipi-
tous and perilous decline. University campuses, the editors believe,
have become slavish devotees of political correctness. In making
their case, the editors point to recent campus episodes in which uni-
versity presidents and members of university boards have come un-
der withering attack, and in some instances been forced to resign,
because they allegedly failed to show appropriate sensitivity to
countering manifestations of prejudice on their campuses. The edi-
tors point to newly adopted campus policies at various universities
requiring "trigger warnings." The editors describe directives ema-
nating from administrative offices describing phrases or ideas to be
* Dean and Professor of Law, Delaware Law School, Widener University. This
Essay is adapted from remarks delivered at the FALR Symposium held at the
University of North Carolina on October 30, 2015. I am most grateful to FALR
for the opportunity to participate.
1 I want to reinforce this sentence by emphasizing that this point is entirely sin-
cere, not intended as any kind of sly wink-and-nod subtly implying an "innuen-
do of a different sort." Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204, 207 (1919). The
actual real-life editors of The First Amendment Law Review responsible for this
symposium issue convened a very balanced and even-handed symposium, with
speakers representing a wide and representative range of viewpoints on the
spectrum of opinions regarding academic freedom.
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avoided by university employees, including faculty members, which
might be perceived as advancing politically incorrect views antithet-
ical to the values of the university. An especially raw point for the ed-
itors is their dismay over the evolution of Title IX,2 which the editors
believe has morphed into a strident legal vehicle for imposing shrill
left-wing political correctness on American higher education, contra-
ry to both the original intent of Congress and the limits imposed by
the Constitution. The editors believe that Title IX has been hijacked
by the executive branch of the federal government. They are dis-
turbed by what they describe as the "ubiquitous culture of victimiza-
tion" in American higher education. They claim that this culture is
invoked to intimidate university employees on American campuses,
including faculty members, from criticizing the processes or rules by
which allegations of sexual assault or sexual harassment are adjudi-
cated in any manner that suggests respect for the rights of those who
are accused and a lack of empathy for their accusers.
FALR has a faculty advisor.3 She is somewhat disturbed by
the lack of balance on the panel of speakers the editors propose to
invite. She expresses her disquiet with the editors, and they have a
civilized and cordial but still pointed discussion. In the end, the pro-
fessor, a former journalist herself, acquiesces. She is reluctant to im-
pose her own professional preferences, which would have been for a
more balanced line-up, upon the student editors.
The speakers recruited for the symposium and conference
are duly invited and signed-up. Academics and lawyers from around
the country will attend, including an untenured, outspoken assistant
professor from UNC Law's nearby law school neighbor, Duke. About
a month before the scheduled event, posters and other publicity de-
scribing the upcoming conference are launched. This is when the
troubles commence.
2 20 U.S.C.A. § 1681 (1972) ("No person in the United States shall, on the basis
of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be sub-
jected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Fed-
eral financial assistance . .. .").
3 Once again, not any current member of the UNC Law faculty, but a fictional
character to be imagined here for educational purposes only.
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Various members of both the University of North Carolina at
Chapel Hill ("UNC") and Duke University communities express alarm
and dismay at the one-sided nature of the planned symposium. The
backlash against the symposium and its manifest agenda goes viral.
Attesting to the strength of the negative reaction to the program,
students, student organizations, and academics on the UNC and Duke
campuses suppress their usual reflex toward rivalry (born of the two
schools' storied competition in athletics and academics), and join
forces. A petition bearing the signatures of members of both cam-
puses demands that the conference be cancelled. The superheated
rhetoric of protest includes a charge that the very holding of the con-
ference may constitute racial and sexual harassment and retaliation.
Several students on both the UNC and Duke campuses who had filed
complaints alleging student-on-student harassment i  violation of
Title IX in the past year threaten to file new Title IX complaints for
retaliation if the conference proceeds as planned. Pressure is
brought on the Chancellor of UNC and the Dean of UNC Law to take
remedial action.4 Adding to the stress on FALR, a number of promi-
nent scholars and lawyers representing points of view in opposition
to the views of those currently represented at the symposium come
forward and volunteer to participate, at their own expense, as addi-
tional panelists. They offer to write articles for FALR as well.
At a tense consultation two weeks before the symposium
date, the student editors of FALR appear in a meeting called by the
University Chancellor and the UNC Law Dean. The students attend
the meeting with a prominent First Amendment attorney from
Washington, D.C.-a litigator who has frequently represented stu-
dents, student organizations, and student publications in suits claim-
ing violation of free speech rights against universities.5 He has volun-
teered to represent FALR, pro bono publico. The student editors and
their lawyer are respectful and thoroughly professional, yet unyield-
ing. They are unwilling to accept the offers of others who have volun-
teered to participate in the symposium, they explain, because they
do not want the general message of the symposium and its accom-
4 Once again, these are fictional characters.
sAgain, a fictional character.
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panying articles diluted. Any attempt to interfere with the symposi-
um, they assert, would violate their First Amendment rights.
The symposium proceeds, and so do the troubles. As the
doors are about to open to the campus conference center facility at
which the symposium is scheduled to be held, the student editors
and FALR staff are stunned to see hundreds of people lined up for en-
try. Such a line is highly unprecedented; for this, after all, is an aca-
demic symposium at a law school, not the opening of Star Wars. The
Editor-in-Chief looks to the Symposium Editor and remarks, "We're
going to need more coffee and donuts."
The masses yearning for entry, it turns out, are not friendly
forces. Several hundred students and faculty members from across
various schools and disciplines at UNC and Duke, who are passion-
ately opposed to the symposium, have descended upon it. They are
brandishing signs and chanting. This is plainly a well-orchestrated
protest, and local media have been tipped off. Film crews and re-
porters from television stations in the Raleigh-Durham-Chapel Hill
market are present to capture the event. Although it is not entirely
clear whether the protestors' agenda is discourse or disruption, the
FALR editors fear the worst.
So many protestors are present that the scheduled room will
not accommodate everyone who has shown up for the event, includ-
ing FALR's speakers and other invitees. Arrangements are made to
move to a larger auditorium. As the conference is called to order, ac-
tual disruption begins. Hundreds stand up and brandish their signs,
chanting protests. Campus police, who had already been summoned
to the scene, look for clues of what to do from various university ad-
ministrators, who have also now arrived. Two faculty members, one
from UNC and one from Duke, along with a handful of students from
each school, are identified as the leaders of the protest coalition. In
hurried negotiations, it is agreed that all will be permitted to stay,
but they must remain silent and seated during presentations. Once
question-and-answer periods begin at the end of each speech or
panel session, they will be permitted to participate, provided they
abide by principles of civility and professional academic discourse.
With this impromptu working treaty in place, the symposium moves
forward.
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About one hour into the event, an exceptionally provocative
symposium speaker raises the temperature in the room. This speak-
er is an untenured assistant professor of law at Duke Law School, in
his second year on the Duke faculty. The professor directly addresses
and attacks the protestors seated before him. His talk is entitled,
"Why Title IX Should Be Repealed," and his driving argument is that
Title IX has damaged American higher education and should be
scrapped. Personally addressing the protestors, he says that they are
wallowing in a culture of self-indulgent victimhood and coddling. He
admonishes them that a university is a place of robust exchange of
ideas, often vehement and caustic, and not a safe haven from views
that one may deem offensive or unsettling. They are cultivating a cul-
ture of politically correct oppression and censorship, he asserts, and
should be ashamed of themselves.
When the speaker finishes, the moderator for this session
looks up at the clock with dread. Would that the time for the panel
had expired, but no, fifteen minutes for questions from the audience
remain. Knowing the words she is about to utter could trigger disas-
ter, she says: "Well, we now have some time for questions from the
audience."
A law student from UNC (an opponent of, not a member of,
FALR) in the front row leaps to her feet, points angrily at the last
speaker from Duke, and screams at him: "You are nothing but a fuck-
ing racist and sexist pig! Who the fuck hired you and made you a pro-
fessor?" The professor from Duke immediately jumps up from his
seat and shouts back at her: "You are exactly the kind of person I am
talking about. You do not belong at a university, and I'd like to know
who the fuck admitted you as a student!"
Sensing that this is not the civilized discourse contemplated
earlier, the moderator jumps in and says, "I think we ought to take a
break and adjourn this session now, and give everyone a chance to
cool off and reflect before we reconvene." The formal session is ad-
journed, but the room now descends into chaos. As shouting and
personal attacks laced with graphic vulgarity reach a pitch bordering
on riot, UNC administrators order the remainder of the event can-
celled and the room cleared.
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II. YOUR ASSIGNMENT, IF YOU CHOOSE TO ACCEPT IT ...
In the aftermath, a plethora of investigations, hearings, and
disciplinary actions are commenced on both the UNC and Duke cam-
puses, leading to later litigation. All of the various claims and coun-
ter-claims of the various contestants land before one federal judge.6
You are a recent law school graduate who has the good for-
tune to be serving as a law clerk to the Judge before whom all these
proceedings will be tried. The Judge says to you that she often de-
cides cases by brooding over the submissions of the parties, and
reaching an "initial intuitive hunch" about the proper resolution of
the conflicts. She then often has one of her clerks carefully research
the case to see if the intuitive leanings of the Judge stand up to rigor-
ous legal analysis. Your Judge explains that she has been influenced
in this approach by an essay written by Judge Joseph C. Hutcheson,
Jr., who once wrote:
I, after canvassing all the available material at my
command, and duly cogitating upon it, give my imag-
ination play, and brooding over the cause, wait for
the feeling, the hunch-that intuitive flash of under-
standing which makes the jump-spark connection be-
tween question and decision, and at the point where
the path is darkest for the judicial feet, sheds its light
along the way.7
The Judge then shares with you her working intuitions: The weakest
claims are those brought by the outside scholars and lawyers who
sought to participate in the symposium, but were denied. They argue
that the symposium was a limited-purpose public forum, and that to
exclude their perspectives constituted impermissible viewpoint dis-
crimination. The FALR symposium, however, is not best understood
as any kind of public forum. It is either an exercise in "government
6 As may happen from time-to-time in the administration of justice, it was de-
cided that all the various legal actions brought would be best consolidated and
tried in one court before one judge.
7 Joseph C. Hutcheson, Jr., TheJudgment Intuitive: The Function of the "Hunch" in
Judicial Decision, 14 CORNELL L.Q. 274, 278 (1929).
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speech,"8 in which FALR is an arm of the state of North Carolina
speaking in its own voice, or it is the private speech9 of the FALR edi-
tors and staff. Either way, the First Amendment challenge fails. The
Judge says she is more inclined to think the speech is the private
speech of FALR. Seen that way, the FALR editors would be akin to the
organizers of the televised political debate in Arkansas Educational
Television Commission v. Forbes,10 in which the Supreme Court held
that a public television station had not created a public forum when
it broadcasted a political debate, and thus maintained independent
editorial control over which candidates qualified for participation."
If FALR is engaged in its own independent speech, then decisions on
what viewpoints to include or exclude belong to FALR, much like the
decisions of parade organizers in Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbi-
an and Bisexual Group of Boston,12 in which the Supreme Court held
that a state could not force a group that had been granted a parade
permit to include parade participants expressing views antithetical
to those of the organizing group.13 The outside scholars and lawyers
are not entitled to rain on FALR's parade.
Although it is likely that the auditorium on the UNC campus
was a public forum, that merely means that the University could not
engage in viewpoint discrimination in decisions as to what student
organizations to grant or deny access to the auditorium, principles
8 See Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460 (2009) (holding that the
placement of a permanent monument in a public park is government speech
and is therefore not restricted by the First Amendment); see also Walker v. Tex.
Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239 (2015) (holding that
Texas specialty license plate designs were government speech and therefore
not restricted by the First Amendment).
9 See generally Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
10 523 U.S. 666 (1998).
11 Id. at 669.
12 515 U.S. 557 (1995).
1s Id. at 559.
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established in cases such as Widmar v. Vincent,14 and Rosenberger v.
Rector & Visitors of the University of Virginia.15
Moving to the actions of UNC officials in shutting down the
symposium once matters appeared to get out of hand, there is some
concern by the Judge that the University may have given in to the
"heckler's veto," by allowing those who came to disrupt the proceed-
ings to effectively shut it down. Perhaps the University should have
cleared the room of only the disruptive members of the audience and
allowed the event to continue.16
A number of complaints were brought by students at both
UNC and Duke, alleging that the content of the symposium, including
the remarks of the Duke professor who touched off the vehement
confrontation, constituted violations of Title IX. Although there is no
question that Title IX reaches both verbal harassment and retalia-
tion, violations of the statute that are triggered by speech, the Judge
suggests-and most surely, the intellectual views advanced by a pro-
fessor regarding issues such as race and gender, sexual harassment,
and Title IX itself-cannot themselves be Title IX violations, for that
14 454 U.S. 263, 267-77 (1981) (holding the denial of access to a university fa-
cilities to a student group that sought to use the facilities for meetings and
events expressing religious viewpoints violated the First Amendment).
15 515 U.S. 819, 837 (1995) (holding the denial of funding to a Christian student
group because its publication expressed strong religious messages violated the
First Amendment).
16 See Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 880 (1997) (reject-
ing a mens rea requirement that "would confer broad powers of censorship, in
the form of a 'heckler's veto,' upon any opponent of indecent speech who might
simply log on and inform the would-be discoursers that his 17-year-old child ...
would be present"); Robb v. Hungerbeeler, 370 F.3d 735, 743 (8th Cir. 2004)
(striking down state's refusal to allow Knights of the Ku Klux Klan to participate
in Adopt-A-Highway program, noting that the state "may not censor AAH appli-
cants' speech because of the potential responses of its recipients. 'The first
amendment knows no heckler's veto,' and the State's desire to exclude contro-
versial organizations in order to prevent 'road rage' or public backlash on the
highways against the adopters' unpopular beliefs is simply not a legitimate gov-
ernmental interest that would support the enactment of speech-abridging regu-
lations.") (citing Lewis v. Wilson, 253 F.3d 1077, 1081-82 (8th Cir. 2001)); see
also Erica Goldberg, Must Universities "Subsidize" Controversial Ideas?: Allocating
Security Fees When Student Groups Host Divisive Speakers, 21 GEO. MASON U. CIV.
RTS. L.J. 349, 359 (2011).
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would raise Title IX above the First Amendment, inverting our fun-
damental constitutional structures.17
The UNC law student who precipitated the shouting match
by dropping the "f-bomb" in her accusatory statement against the
Duke professor was disciplined by a law school hearing board for vi-
olating rules governing student conduct at curricular and co-
curricular events. The sanction was a one-semester ban from partic-
ipation in student-organizations and symposia, a ban that would be
lifted if the student voluntarily agreed to seek anger management
counseling. In a First Amendment challenge to this disciplinary ac-
tion, the Judge is of the view that a law school is entitled to enforce
norms of professionalism on its students akin to those that would
govern lawyers admitted to practice.18 Courts would not tolerate
17 See H. ex rel. Hawk v. Easton Area Sch. Dist., 725 F.3d 293 (3d Cir. 2013) (en
banc), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1515 (2014). The Third Circuit rejected a school's
proffered defense under Title IX in sustaining a § 1983 action challenging a ban
on the wearing of breast-cancer awareness bracelets that used an "I love boo-
bies" motif (with a heart symbolizing "love"). Id. at 297-98. The court held that
the ban violated the First Amendment rights of the students, reasoning that the
bracelets involved commentary on an important political and cultural issue.
They were not lewd, and posed no substantial disruption of school activities. Id.
at 298. Title IX, the court ruled, did not offer the school district any shelter. Id. at
322. Even assuming that protecting students from harassment under Title IX
would satisfy First Amendment standards permitting schools to protect the
rights of other students, the wearing of the bracelets would not breed the sort
of environment of pervasive and severe harassment required to state a claim
under Title IX. Id. at 322-23.
18 See, e.g., Brown v. Li, 308 F.3d 939, 953 (9th Cir. 2002) (reasoning that defer-
ence was owed to the university's enforcement of academic and professional
norms and rejecting a First Amendment challenge to such actions). The case in-
volved a graduate student, Christopher Brown, who had his scientific thesis ap-
proved on its academic merits by his thesis committee. Id. at 943. After obtain-
ing the approval signatures, he added a section, labeled as
"Disacknowledgements," which began: "I would like to offer special Fuck You's
to the following degenerates for of being an ever-present hindrance during my
graduate career . . . ." Id. Brown then identified the graduate school's dean and
staff, library managers, former California Governor Pete Wilson, the Regents of
the University of California, and "Science" as "having been particularly obstruc-
tive to his progress toward his graduate degree." Id. Brown "later explained that
he had not revealed the section to the members of his committee because he
feared that they would not approve it." Id.
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such outbursts and vulgarity in a courtroom.19 On the other hand,
one instance of vulgar shouting by one lawyer to another in the heat
of a tense negotiation would not normally rise to a level warranting
discipline by bar authorities-but that is probably more a matter of
administrative discretion than First Amendment principle.
The untenured assistant professor at Duke who gave the
provocative speech and responded to the student's vulgar accusation
with his pointed counter-attack, which also used the "f-bomb," was
denied retention by Duke. The Law School Tenure and Promotion
Committee, with the support of the law school dean,20 cited the inci-
dent at the symposium as among the reasons for reaching the judg-
ment that the professor was not making "reasonable progress" to-
ward tenure and or promotion, and ought not be retained. That
professor sued Duke, claiming both violations of his First Amend-
ment rights and breach of contract. He claims that his contract with
Duke effectively imports by reference First Amendment standards
and traditional norms of academic freedom in American higher edu-
cation, and that the actions of Duke and UNC were sufficiently inter-
twined to satisfy the state action requirement necessary to support
his pure First Amendment claim. The Judge is quite sure Duke's ac-
tions are not state action, and is inclined to dismiss that claim as all
but frivolous. The Judge does deem it plausible that Duke has effec-
tively incorporated First Amendment principles and academic free-
dom traditions into its contract with the professor.21 It is far from
19 See Rodney Smolla, Regulating the Speech ofJudges and Lawyers: The First
Amendment and the Soul of the Profession, 66 FLA. L. REV. 961, 968 (2014); see
also Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1, 5 (1952) (upholding the power of courts
to use their contempt authority to sanction a lawyer for his expression within a
courtroom and observing that "[t]he nature of the [lawyer's] deportment was
not such as merely to offend personal sensitivities of the judge, but it prejudiced
the expeditious, orderly and dispassionate conduct of the trial").
20 All fictional characters and not actual professors or the Dean of Duke Law
School.
21 See Philip Lee, A Contract Theory ofAcademic Freedom, 59 ST. Louis U. L.J. 461,
462 (2015) ("As an alternative to an exclusively First Amendment foundation
for this freedom, I argue for a contract law-based conception specifically for
professors. Contract law allows courts to protect the rights of professors at both
public and private universities. It also allows for the recognition of professional
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clear, however, that the professor's outburst against the student was
protected under the First Amendment (as incorporated by contract),
or protected under traditions of academic freedom. The matter is
perhaps more complex because the incident occurred at a symposi-
um on the UNC campus (an "away game," so to speak) and did not
involve a Duke law student, but a student from UNC. Even so, the
Judge suspects that Duke may demand of its faculty members certain
measures of decorum and civility and respect for students in all their
professional endeavors, and that the law school as an institution is
entitled to considerable deference by courts in the exercise of its dis-
cretion on these matters. The professor has alleged that the outburst
was not the real motivating factor behind the denial of tenure, but
rather that Duke was motivated by a more sinister and illicit mo-
tive-its disagreement with the professor's outspoken and contro-
versial views on Title IX and his ideas about "the culture of victimiza-
tion" on American university campuses. The professor was denied
tenure, he claims, because he was not politically correct, a form of
viewpoint discrimination that would be impermissible at a state uni-
versity, and is impermissible at a private university if those same
norms are imported into the contractual arrangement between the
professor and the university. Although this claim is colorable, the
Judge concludes, it is really a state-law based claim involving an in-
terpretation of the nature of the "academic freedom" component of
the professor's contract with Duke, and in the absence of a viable
claim arising under the First Amendment, ought to be dismissed,
perhaps to be litigated in state court, where the professor's case real-
ly belongs.
The Judge has also decided to dismiss for failure to state a
cognizable First Amendment claim a suit brought by UNC against the
state of North Carolina, arising from a state law passed in direct re-
sponse to this entire episode, barring all public universities in the
state from using state funds to support conferences and symposia
that do not attempt to present multiple perspectives and balanced
norms and academic custom in interpreting the rights and duties of professors
and their universities.").
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presentations on issues of public concern. This law, modeled after
the "Fairness Doctrine" that the Federal Communications Commis-
sion once enforced against television and radio broadcasters,22 was
challenged as unconstitutionally vague, overbroad, and contrary to
the First Amendment academic freedom rights of the state's public
universities. On this point, the hunch of the Judge is that a state
agency (such as UNC) cannot have First Amendment rights enforce-
able against the state that created it. This is the creature suing the
creator, or the state suing itself, and simply can't be sound.23
The Judge says to you that in reading all of the various plead-
ings and papers of the parties, she has been astonished at how all the
various claimants and all the various defendants from both the UNC
and Duke campuses have invoked the phrase "academic freedom" as
the major mantra of their claims and defenses. The Judge expresses
her suspicion to you that they can't all be right, and asks for you to
research the matter, and share your results. Your assignment is not
to exhaustively research all of the issues with supporting authorities
at this point-that will come later. What the Judge first wants is
some research on what she anticipates will be the opening "pream-
ble" segment of the opinion (or opinions) she must write, setting the
stage generally for what to make of this notion of "academic free-
dom" as it impacts her legal analysis on specific questions.
III. THE CONUNDRUMS...
Enthusiastically, you dive in. This is good stuff, not the run-
of-the mill drug cases you so often work on when assisting the Judge
with her docket. Diving in, however, you are increasingly confound-
ed. The landscape is terribly muddled, filled with complexity and un-
certainty.
You start, as the Judge asked you to start, with a handful of
her fundamental questions. Is "academic freedom" a legal doctrine-
is it law in the sense that courts know law-or is it more in the na-
ture of a colloquial phrase with no load-bearing legal engineering
22 See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
23See infra note 59 and accompanying text.
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power, something more like "artistic freedom?" If academic freedom
is a legal right, what is its source? The Constitution? The law of con-
tracts? Both? If academic freedom does exist as a legal right, who
possesses that legal right? Is it an individual right that may be as-
serted by professors? Do students possess the right? Do student or-
ganizations or publications possess it, or is it only possessed by insti-
tutions-by universities or law schools as entities? And what if these
competing claimants assert the rights in an adversarial fashion
against each other? How do the academic freedom rights of the First
Amendment Law Review, or its individual student editors, or its facul-
ty advisor, for example, fare in a showdown with the rights of UNC
Law or UNC? Who has the trumps? Is the array of rights at a public
university the same as at a private? Or do the rights morph as the
setting moves up the Route 15-501 highway from UNC to Duke?
IV. Is "ACADEMIC FREEDOM" A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT?
Undaunted, you push forward, and begin to make some dis-
coveries. There are plentiful invocations of the phrase "academic
freedom" in judicial decisions, including Supreme Court opinions.24
At its most expansive, the Supreme Court has boldly pronounced:
"Our Nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic freedom,
which is of transcendent value to all of us and not merely to the
teachers concerned."25
On closer inspection, however, most references to "academic
freedom" as constitutional aw in the judicial opinions appear to be
applying other standard constitutional provisions-the Free Speech
Clause, the Due Process Clause, or the Equal Protection Clause, typi-
cally-to academic settings. There is good reason to believe that "ac-
ademic freedom" is not a free-standing constitutional right, entirely
24 See, e.g., Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967); see also Sweezy
v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957) ("We believe that there unques-
tionably was an invasion of petitioner's liberties in the areas of academic free-
dom and political expression-areas in which government should be extremely
reticent to tread.").
25 Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 603.
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distinct from, for example, the rights of free expression granted un-
der the Free Speech Clause.
Because the setting for this scenario is North Carolina, a
Fourth Circuit case, Urofsky v. Gilmore,26 provides a useful illustra-
tion. A group of state university professors from a variety of Virginia
colleges and universities brought a suit against the state of Virginia
challenging a rule that prohibited all state employees, including state
university professors, from accessing sexually explicit materials on
their state-owned computers without prior permission from their
department supervisors.27 The professors claimed the restriction vi-
olated the First Amendment.28 The court, sitting en banc, rejected the
claim.29 In the course of that rejection, the majority observed, "'Aca-
demic freedom' is a term that is often used, but little explained, by
federal courts."30 The majority decided that academic freedom was
more in the nature of a professional norm than a constitutional
right.31 To the extent that it was a constitutional right, the majority
26216 F.3d 401 (4th Cir. 2000) (en banc).
27 1d. at 404.
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 Id. at 410 (citing W. Stuart Stuller, High School Academic Freedom: The Evolu-
tion of a Fish Out of Water, 77 NEB. L.REv. 301, 302 (1998) ("[C]ourts are re-
markably consistent in their unwillingness to give analytical shape to the rheto-
ric of academic freedom."); see also J. Peter Byrne, Academic Freedom: A "Special
Concern of the First Amendment", 99 YALE L.J. 251, 253 (1989) ("Lacking defini-
tion or guiding principle, the doctrine [of academic freedom] floats in the law,
picking up decisions as a hull does barnacles.")).
31 Urofsky, 216 F.3d at 410. See also Emergency Coal. to Defend Educ. Travel v.
U.S. Dept. of the Treasury, 545 F.3d 4, 15 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (Edwards, J., concur-
ring) ("The disposition of the First Amendment issue in this case on grounds
other than academic freedom is relatively straightforward and uncomplicated.
Therefore, it is unnecessary for us to parse the many difficult issues relating to
the concept and scope of 'academic freedom,' including, inter alia : whether ac-
ademic freedom is a constitutional right at all; the breadth of academic free-
dom; whether academic freedom implicates additional constitutional interests
that are not fully accounted for by the Supreme Court's customary employee-
speech jurisprudence; whether a professor may assert an individual constitu-
tional right of academic freedom against a university employer; how academic
freedom should be enforced in public versus private universities; whether and
how we distinguish between the university-as-a-speaker and the university-as-
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held, it was a right that rested with institutions, not individuals. 32 It
was true, the court conceded, "homage has been paid to the ideal of
academic freedom in a number of Supreme Court opinions, often
with reference to the First Amendment."33 However, the court insist-
ed, "The Supreme Court, to the extent it has constitutionalized a right
of academic freedom at all, appears to have recognized only an insti-
tutional right of self-governance in academic affairs."34
Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson and Judge Michael Luttig had their
own intra-court debate. Judge Luttig chided his colleague for an
opinion Judge Wilkinson wrote concurring in the judgment, an opin-
ion that Judge Luttig read as advocating recognition of a new-
fangled, illegitimate, and woefully ill-defined right:
First, it is unclear even in whom Judge Wil-
kinson would create his new constitutional
right. For example, from reading his opinion,
one cannot discern whether he is creating a
right in professors generally, in only university
professors, in all academics, in all institutions of
learning, in only universities, in all public em-
ployees, in some of the above, or in all of the
above. All that is clear is that he is emphatic that
a new constitutional right must be created.35
Judge Luttig objected to the creation of such a right, arguing that
Judge Wilkinson did "not even attempt to support the existence of
such a right in either the text of the Constitution or Supreme Court
an-employer in assessing the contours of academic freedom; and the extent to
which professors have rights of academic freedom in university governance.").
32 Urofsky, 216 F.3d at 410.
33 Id. at 411-12 (citing Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 226,
411 n.12 (1985); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312-13
(1978) (opinion of Powell, J.); Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603
(1967); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957) (plurality opin-
ion); Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 261-63 (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
341d. at 412.
s Id. at 417 (Luttig, J., concurring).
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precedents, or even through resort to the history or traditions of our
Nation."36
Judge Wilkinson, in contrast, appeared to ground his concep-
tion of academic freedom in traditions of shared university govern-
ance:
The Commonwealth has made the judgment that
universities themselves are best equipped to
balance the enormous promise of the Internet
against the novel risks that may accompany it.
Because the limited restrictions in this Act are
administered within the traditional structure of
university governance, I do not believe the Vir-
ginia statute contravenes the Constitution.3 7
Judge Wilkinson insisted that it was not his intent to create a new
constitutional right. Rather, he argued, the job at hand was to exam-
ine the claim of the professors under an existing right-freedom of
speech-but aking into account the academic setting.3 8 In that
sense, Judge Wilkinson's opinion might have proved prescient.
Although professors at public universities may not be partic-
ularly fond of thinking of themselves as regular government employ-
ees, they do get their checks from the state. They are employees of
the state, and thus ostensibly, when fired or disciplined for speech
related to their employment, would be subject to the general First
Amendment test that has evolved governing the speech of govern-
ment employees. That Connick / Pickering / Ceballos test, named for
36 Id. at 419.
37 Id. at 434 (Wilkinson, J., concurring).
38 Id. at 434 ("I would, however, create no new right of any sort. I would simply
review the form, content, and context of the speech at issue-something that
the Supreme Court requires us to do in Connick and that the majority steadfast-
ly refuses to do. The consequence of the majority's failure could not be more
serious. Under the majority's view, even the grossest statutory restrictions on
public employee speech will be evaluated by a simple calculus: if speech in-
volves one's position as a public employee, it will enjoy no First Amendment
protection whatsoever. My colleagues in the majority would thus permit any
statutory restriction on academic speech and research, even one that baldly
discriminated on the basis of social perspective or political point of view.").
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the three Supreme Court cases that have shaped it, has two parts. A
court first determines whether the employee spoke as a citizen on a
matter of public concern.40 If the court determines that answer is no,
the case is over, and no First Amendment claim may be brought.41 If
the answer is yes, the court proceeds to part two of the test, a balanc-
ing exercise that focuses on the strength of the government employ-
er's justification, taking into account the extent to which the speech
may disrupt the functioning and efficiency of the government agen-
cy.42 In Garcetti v. Ceballos,43 the third case in this trilogy, the Su-
preme Court engrafted on step one of the test a bright-line rule. If an
employee's expression arises from his or her official responsibilities,
the Court held, it will automatically be deemed to be speech as an
employee, and not speech as a citizen speaking on a matter of public
concern.44 The majority opinion in Garcetti thus essentially adopted
the same strict view of government employee speech as the en banc
majority in Urofsky in the Fourth Circuit. There was, however, a ca-
veat. Justice Souter, dissenting in Garcetti, was especially troubled by
the implications of the Court's new bright line when applied to the
speech of public university professors. Justice Souter lamented:
This ostensible domain beyond the pale of the
First Amendment is spacious enough to include
even the teaching of a public university profes-
sor, and I have to hope that today's majority
does not mean to imperil First Amendment pro-
tection of academic freedom in public colleges
39 Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983); Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563
(1968); Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006).
40 Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 418 ("Pickering and the cases decided in its wake identify
two inquiries to guide interpretation of the constitutional protections accorded
to public employee speech. The first requires determining whether the employ-




44 Id. at 421 ("We hold that when public employees make statements pursuant
to their official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First
Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their communica-
tions from employer discipline.").
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and universities, whose teachers necessarily
speak and write "pursuant to ... official du-
ties."45
Apparently regarding Justice Souter's point as potentially well taken,
the Garcetti majority suggested that there might well be an "academ-
ic speech" exception to the bright-line rule, a special carve out for
professors. The majority thus conceded:
There is some argument that expression related
to academic scholarship or classroom instruc-
tion implicates additional constitutional inter-
ests that are not fully accounted for by this
Court's customary employee-speech jurispru-
dence. We need not, and for that reason do not,
decide whether the analysis we conduct today
would apply in the same manner to a case in-
volving speech related to scholarship or teach-
ing.46
This sounds remarkably close to Judge Wilkinson's point in Urofsky.
Whether the potential exception to Garcetti for academic speech is
treated as recognition of a separate right of "academic freedom" or
simply the application of normal government employee free speech
jurisprudence adjusted to reflect the unique context of universities
may be mere semantic preference. However phrased, if the potential
exception ultimately comes to be realized as settled law, there is a
sense in which professors at public universities appear to have free
speech rights superior to those of other government employees. At
least two federal court of appeals decisions, including one in the
Fourth Circuit arising from UNC-Wilmington, have adopted this aca-
demic speech exception to Garcetti.47
4 Id. at 438 (Souter, J., dissenting).
46 Id. at 425 (majority opinion).
47 See Demers v. Austin, 746 F.3d 402, 412 (9th Cir. 2014); Adams v. Trs. of the
Univ. of N.C.-Wilmington, 640 F.3d 550, 562 (4th Cir. 2011) ("We are also per-
suaded that Garcetti would not apply in the academic context of a public univer-
sity as represented by the facts of this case.").
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Yet to live by the sword is to die by the sword, and to recog-
nize that there may be special considerations in free speech cases
when applying constitutional doctrines to conflicts in higher educa-
tion may require recognition that the "unique setting" of the univer-
sity may cut in many directions. One of the traditional lodestars of
free speech doctrine in the general marketplace is that courts will
view with great skepticism any government regulation that discrim-
inates on the basis of content, typically applying strict scrutiny re-
view to content-based regulation.48 Importing this rule to the arena
of higher education, however, is highly problematic, because univer-
sities and the professors and administrators and students who com-
prise them are engaged in content discrimination all the time. It is
what they do. The Ninth Circuit has observed:
The nature and strength of the interest of an
employing academic institution will also be dif-
ficult to assess. Possible variations are almost
infinite. For example, the nature of classroom
discipline, and the part played by the teacher or
professor in maintaining discipline, will be dif-
ferent depending on whether the school in ques-
tion is a public high school or a university, or on
whether the school in question does or does not
have a history of discipline problems. Further,
the degree of freedom an instructor should have
in choosing what and how to teach will vary de-
pending on whether the instructor is a high
school teacher or a university professor. Still
further, the evaluation of a professor's writing
for purposes of tenure or promotion involves a
48 Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S.Ct. 2218, 2226 (2015) ("Content-based laws-
those that target speech based on its communicative content-are presump-
tively unconstitutional and may be justified only if the government proves that
they are narrowly tailored to serve compelling state interests."); see also Texas
v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) ("If there is a bedrock principle under-
lying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the
expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive
or disagreeable.").
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judgment by the employing university about the
quality of what he or she has written. Ordinarily,
such a content-based judgment is anathema to
the First Amendment. But in the academic
world, such a judgment is both necessary and
appropriate. Here too, recognizing our limita-
tions, we should hesitate before concluding that
we know better than the institution itself the na-
ture and strength of its legitimate interests.49
Your research thus far, you realize, is still a long way from definitive-
ly resolving many of the cases in front of the Judge. But you are be-
ginning to have some hope that you may be starting to help sweep
away some of the underbrush.
"Academic freedom" may or may not be a freestanding con-
stitutional right. To the extent that it has independent force as a con-
stitutional value, it appears to render that force in several directions,
some of which may be in tension. Formal legal doctrine appears to
place the center of gravity with institutions, meaning that universi-
ties as entities, rather than professors or students, are the more
compelling claimants to academic freedom as a constitutional right.
But that picture is also not entirely clean. The possibility that profes-
sors, at least, may possess a kind of "get out of jail free" card exemp-
tion from the Garcetti rule appears to make any showdown between
a professor and university a closer fight. Yet even that doctrine is
qualified by the idea that universities are granted a wide berth of
discretion, through traditional systems of peer review and shared
governance, to engage in content-based judgments regarding the
quality of academic teaching and research.
V. PUBLIC VS. PRIVATE (OR TAR HEELS VS. BLUE DEVILS, BY ANY OTHER
NAME) ...
Do constitutional doctrines relating to universities play out
differently at public and state universities? Are the rules governing
4 Demers v. Austin, 746 F.3d 402, 413 (9th Cir. 2014).
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UNC different from the rules governing Duke? Your research leads
you to tentatively conclude, "Yes and no."
When a public university acts to discipline the behavior of
faculty and students, it is not simply the university acting, but the
state itself.50 UNC is not simply a university in North Carolina but of
North Carolina. When the university chancellor or the dean of the
law school makes policy, they act under color of law.51 Correspond-
ingly, when those university officials act to sanction faculty members
or students, they are restricted by the Constitution, because those
faculty members or students may claim constitutional rights that
may be asserted against government authority.52
Private universities are different. As a matter of constitution-
al law, a professor at Duke does not have the same constitutional
protections as a professor at UNC, because when Duke administra-
tors or boards take action against the professor, that action is not
governmental, and thus not restricted by the Constitution.
The plot again thickens, however, when we consider the in-
stitutional rights of universities. When government attempts to regu-
late the affairs of a private university, the private university is enti-
tled to invoke, in its corporate capacity, the protections of the
Constitution. If the state of North Carolina were to try to dictate aca-
demic policy to Duke, Duke would have a colorable constitutional en-
titlement to resist. This notion is as old as the famous Dartmouth Col-
lege case,53 and as new as Citizens United v. Federal Election
50 Corum v. Univ. of N.C., 330 N.C. 761, 413 S.E.2d 276 (1992) (holding that state
university officials were state actors for purposes of free speech claim brought
by a faculty member of Appalachian State University).
51 d.
52 Id.
s Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518 (1819). In Dartmouth Col-
lege, a case traditionally studied in corporate law courses, the Supreme Court
refused to allow a hostile takeover of Dartmouth by the state of New Hamp-
shire. In many respects, however, the case is a precursor to modern academic
freedom jurisprudence. Chief Justice John Marshall, who was by lore and leg-
end moved to tears by the oratory of Daniel Webster, a graduate of Dartmouth
who argued the cause before the Supreme Court, wrote an opinion that, while
cast in the formal garb of corporate law, was really an institutional academic
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Committee54 and Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.55 In Hobby Lobby
the Supreme Court rejected the view that closely-held for-profit cor-
porations could not assert violations of their religious liberty, repu-
diating the theory that corporations, as artificial for-profit legal fic-
tions, could not possess legally cognizable interests in "religious
freedom."56 In a powerful decision, the Supreme Court renounced
the argument that the corporate form was itself determinative and
instead assessed the underlying human realities:
But it is important to keep in mind that the pur-
pose of this fiction is to provide protection for
human beings. A corporation is simply a form of
organization used by human beings to achieve
desired ends. An established body of law speci-
fies the rights and obligations of the people (in-
cluding shareholders, officers, and employees)
who are associated with a corporation in one
way or another. When rights, whether constitu-
tional or statutory, are extended to corpora-
freedom case, defending the independence of the private university Dartmouth
to chart its own course.
s4 558 U.S. 310 (2010). The decision in Citizens United was predicated in large
part on the Supreme Court's view of the nature of the "personality" of corpora-
tions. The Supreme Court in Citizens United pointedly rejected any mechanistic
limitations on the corporate personality grounded in the superficial truism that
corporations are "artificial" and not "natural" beings, observing that "[t]he
Court has thus rejected the argument that political speech of corporations or
other associations should be treated differently under the First Amendment
simply because such associations are not 'natural persons."' Id. at 343. As Jus-
tice Scalia observed in his concurring opinion in Citizens United, non-profit as-
sociational entities were a principal concern of "corporations" as known by the
framers of the Constitution. Id. at 338 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("At the time of the
founding, religious, educational, and literary corporations were incorporated
under general incorporation statutes, much as business corporations are to-
day.").
ss 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2767 (2014).
56 Id. at 2759.
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tions, the purpose is to protect the rights of the-
se people.57
If a private university such as Duke has constitutional claims that
might be interposed against regulation by the state of North Caroli-
na, does the same apply to UNC? At least as a matter of federal con-
stitutional law, the better view is no. There may be odd state consti-
tutional provisions in some states that grant to state universities
independence that allows them to resist, as a matter of state law, en-
croachments by the political branches.58 But the standard paradigm
7 Id. at 2768. The Court pointed to a decision from decades before, Braunfeld v.
Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961), to illustrate the flaw that inheres in slavish obei-
sance to the corporate form. In Braunfeld, five Orthodox Jewish merchants who
ran small retail businesses in Philadelphia challenged a Pennsylvania Sunday
closing law as a violation of the Free Exercise Clause. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at
2767. As the Hobby Lobby Court explained, if the formality of "incorporation"
governed, the law "would put these merchants to a difficult choice: either give
up the right to seek judicial protection of their religious liberty or forgo the
benefits, available to their competitors, of operating as corporations." Id. The
better view, the Hobby Lobby Court held, was to discard these legal formalisms;
the Court thus repudiated the position, adopted by the Third Circuit, that
[g]eneral business corporations do not, separate and apart from the actions or
belief systems of their individual owners or employees, exercise religion. Id. at
2768. They do not pray, worship, observe sacraments or take other religiously-
motivated actions separate and apart from the intention and direction of their
individual actors."' Id. at 2768 (quoting 724 F.3d, at 385). The Supreme Court
instead addressed the heart of the matter, which is that corporations can never
do anything separate and apart from the humans who constitute them. Id. ("All
of this is true-but quite beside the point. Corporations, 'separate and apart
from' the human beings who own, run, and are employed by them, cannot do
anything at all.").
58 See, e.g., Regents of Univ. of Minnesota v. Lord, 257 N.W.2d 796, 798-800
(Minn. 1977) ("Historically, the grant of power to the university came in two
steps. The original charter of the university was enacted in 1851. Its central
purpose was to create a corporation. Among other things it declared that 'the
government of this University shall be vested in a Board of twelve Regents.' The
university functioned under the act of 1851 until a state constitution was
adopted in 1857. What was then art. 8, § 3, of the state constitution 'perpetuat-
ed' to the university 'all the rights, immunities, franchises and endowments
heretofore granted or conferred.' By so doing, the Board of Regents of the Uni-
versity was invested with a power of management in the area of the governing
290 FIRST AMENDMENT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 14
is the opposite. State universities are creatures of the state. The crea-
ture cannot sue the creator.59
You are struck by this. You are not quite sure whether you
are observing symmetry or asymmetry, but either way, it seems a bit
odd to you. At public universities, legally enforceable constitutional
rights are limited to individuals who populate the university, such as
students and faculty. But the state university does not possess legally
enforceable federal constitutional rights against the government that
created it. In contrast, private universities and colleges clearly pos-
sess legally enforceable constitutional rights as institutions in resist-
ing encroachments on their institutional freedom by government
agencies, but the students and professors at those private schools do
not have constitutional rights that may be asserted against their uni-
versities as institutions.
of the duties of the university of which the legislature could not deprive them,
subject to the right of the people to amend or repeal the constitution.").
5 See Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration and Immigrant
Rights and Fight for Equality By Any Means Necessary (BAMN), 134 S. Ct. 1623,
1636-37 (2014) (rejecting a challenge to the power of the state of Michigan to
impose, through constitutional memorandum, a rule banning affirmative action
at Michigan state universities, stating: "Our constitutional system embraces,
too, the right of citizens to debate so they can learn and decide and then,
through the political process, act in concert to try to shape the course of their
own times and the course of a nation that must strive always to make freedom
ever greater and more secure. Here Michigan voters acted in concert and
statewide to seek consensus and a opt a policy on a difficult subject against a
historical background of race in America that has been a source of tragedy and
persisting injustice. That history demands that we continue to learn, to listen,
and to remain open to new approaches if we are to aspire always to a constitu-
tional order in which all persons are treated with fairness and equal dignity.
Were the Court to rule that the question addressed by Michigan voters is too
sensitive or complex to be within the grasp of the electorate; or that the policies
at issue remain too delicate to be resolved save by university officials or facul-
ties, acting at some remove from immediate public scrutiny and control; or that
these matters are so arcane that the electorate's power must be limited because
the people cannot prudently exercise that power even after a full debate, that
holding would be an unprecedented restriction on the exercise of a fundamen-
tal right held not just by one person but by all in common. It is the right to speak
and debate and learn and then, as a matter of political will, to act through a law-
ful electoral process.").
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This makes good logical sense to you as formal legal doctrine,
but you find something instinctually disturbing about the picture.
Whether or not it is counter-intuitive, it is surely counter-
experiential. You doubt that the professors and students at Duke
think they have fewer rights than the professors and students at
UNC. As to institutional freedom, your intuition is that both public
and private universities do enjoy some measure of institutional au-
tonomy. You also wonder, in the end, however, whether that auton-
omy may ever rise higher than the board of trustees or regents or di-
rectors that govern any college or university-public or private.
Whether the governing board is a political entity, as in the case of
public universities, or a private non-profit corporate entity, as in the
case of private non-profit universities, the board ultimately dictates
policy. In the general scheme of things, a university cannot prevail
against its own board.
So what is it that both intuition and experience are telling
you? It may be this: In the world of higher education, the distinctions
between public and private institutions, when it comes to norms of
academic freedom, may be highly exaggerated. At the individual lev-
el, the contractual arrangement between most faculty members and
students at private universities effectively imports the First Amend-
ment rights that faculty members and students have at public uni-
versities. A Duke professor is thus likely to possess roughly the same
bundle of "academic freedom" legal rights against Duke as a UNC
professor has against the state of North Carolina. At UNC, the rights
stem directly from the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment.
At Duke the same bundle of rights are imported by reference in the
contractual arrangements that govern the relationship between
Duke and its faculty, including whatever guarantees of "academic
freedom" are embedded in the university's regulations and core
documents, such as its faculty handbook. Students at Duke are in a
roughly parallel position to students at UNC, though for the Duke
students the formal source of law is their contract with the universi-
ty, not the Constitution.
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VI. CONCLUSION
As you are laboring over this seemingly interminable thicket
of material, your Judge pops into your small law clerk's office, locat-
ed outside the Judge's capacious chambers. She asks you how it is go-
ing. Suddenly a lyric from an Alanis Morissette song pops into your
head, and you blurt out, "What it all comes down to, is that I haven't
got it all figured out just yet." 60
The Judge smiles and responds, "That's fine, I don't blame
you! It's a pretty mixed up area. Why don't you show me what you've
got so far, and I will take it from there?"
And so you do.
60 ALANIS MORISSETTE, Hand in My Pocket, on JAGGED LITTLE PILL (Maverick Records
1995).
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